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7 Agent identity in economics 
JOHN B. DAVIS' 
1 Introduction 
Many economists would agree that as a social science economics aims to 
explain cause-and-effect relationships in economic life, and aims to do so 
in close conjunction with an analysis of agency. Yet though economists 
constantly refer to economic agents when they speak of individuals 
making choices, the concept of agency itself is not sharply defined in 
economics. I define agency as the power to initiate and bring about 
events. Economic agents, then, have the power to initiate economic 
activity, and, together with other causal factors, such as capital, 
institutional arrangements, natural resources, etc., help bring about 
events seen as the causal effects of their actions. Choice, economists' 
main concern, is thus an aspect of agency in that its analysis helps us 
account for how economic agents act on the world. But choice needs to 
be understood in a wider framework of cause-and-effect explanation if 
economic agents are to be understood specifically as agents with powers 
to initiate and bring about events when making choices. 
Another way of seeing economic agents as agents in a causal sense is to 
recognize that on this conception economic agents actually exist, and 
that adopting a cause-and-effect view of economic agents commits one to 
an ontological realism about economic agents in the sense distinguished 
by Miiki in his taxonomy of realisms (1992). Note that while most 
economists would say they are interested in actually existing economic 
agents, many would also allow that the logic of choice - or how agents 
ought to behave - may be evaluated apart from the question of whether 
there are agents whose choice behavior that logic describes (Sugden 1991, 
• Thanks to Tony Lawson, Uskali Miiki, Jochen Runde, and Alex Viskovatoff - without 
implication - for thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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p. 752). On the view here, however, the investigation of economic agency 
requires one to suppose that there are economic agents with real powers 
to bring about events as the effects of their actions. This emphasis calls 
for some re-orientation of contemporary economics, since with the 
considerable development of axiomatic decision theory in the postwar 
period pursued apart from a realism about economic agents, it seems fair 
to say that the discipline has not focused on explaining how economic 
agents actually bring about events. 
In the discussion that follows I begin to set out an ontological frame-
work for an analysis of economic agents by developing stategies for 
investigating the location and scope of economic agency, where each of 
these considerations pertains to a relatively separate set of issues involved 
in an ontology of agents . A related way of approaching the topic of 
agency that has tangencies to philosophers' work on personal identity is 
as the investigation of the identification of economic agents or agent 
identity in economics. This paper consequently might also be thought to 
investigate how we identify or account for the identity of economic 
agents in terms of the location and the scope of their agency. Or, using 
philosophers' personal identity language, the paper investigates both 
how we distinguish or individuate agents - the business of locating them 
- and how we re-identify or track agents through change in their 
characteristics and surroundings - the business of determining what 
scope their agency possesses or sustains. 
The rationale for using philosophers' thinking about personal identity 
to investigate agent identity in economics needs to be highlighted at the 
outset. In supposing economic agents actually exist, one in effect assigns 
oneself the task of explaining how and for how long economic agents 
exist. How they exist is a matter of accounting for where they are active. 
I label this the question of agents' location, though it will be readily seen 
that more is involved than simply picking out agents' site of operation, 
since where they are active leads us immediately to claims about the 
manner in which they are active and some ascription of powers to them. 
The question of how long agents exist concerns the durability of their 
powers. I label this the question of the scope of economic agency. Thus 
described, it will be seen that the issues of location and scope of agency 
are means of explaining agents' causal effectiveness. This focus is slightly 
different than is involved in philosophers' investigation of personal 
identity, since only some approaches to personal identity emphasize the 
effects of individuals' actions on the world . But the agent identity 
approach adopted in this paper shares the general realist concern 
personal identity theorists have regarding the persistence and distinctness 
of a type of real being in the world. For this reason, personal identity 
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theory offers insights for economics that may help develop an onto-
logically realist view of economic agents as having causal powers. 
Miiki, in his taxonomy of realisms, distinguishes referential realism and 
representational realism. Referential realism, or the seman tical thesis that 
the terms of language and science refer to real entities, connects in 
important respects to the issue of how we locate economic agents. Our use 
of language reflects our ontological commitments, and one such commit-
ment is that the things we refer to are real entities. But to successfully refer 
to real entities implies that we can ontologically distinguish or individuate 
those real entities in the world. Thus we may begin to investigate the 
location of agents through an analysis of our modes of reference. In 
contrast, representational realism, or the seman tical thesis that attributive 
statements ascribe properties to real entities, has important connections 
to the issue of what scope or extent of power economic agents may be said 
to have. Here our ontological commitments·specifically concern the 
magnitude and duration of economic agency, or how long and with what 
force real agents exercise their powers as agents. Thus we may begin to 
investigate the scope of agency through an analysis of how economic 
agents are represented in the language of economic theory. 
This paper consequently attempts an analysis of the location and scope 
of economic agency in terms of these two forms of realism, so as to link 
ontological and seman tical thinking on the subject. It postpones a veristic 
realist analysis of agents (also distinguished by Miiki) on the grounds 
that establishing truths about the forms of economic agency first requires 
that one identify those agents whose actions have real effects in economic 
life. Roughly speaking, ontology precedes epistemology. As an illustra-
tive framework, the second section of the paper begins by critically 
examining the standard neoclassical view of economic agents, and 
characterizes it as unsuccessful in its ability to identify economic agents. 
The third section of the paper then offers an alternative, realist approach 
to locating economic agents, discusses routines as a form of phenomena 
that exhibits agency relationships, and closes with a proposed criterion 
for locating agents. The fourth section turns to how we may address the 
difficult topic of agency's scope, considers the point-in-time and through-
time dimensions this involves, and introduces considerations pertaining 
to multiple sources of agency and changes in its structure. The paper 
concludes with three brief remarks to clarify principal themes of the 
discussion. 
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2 The neoclassical approach to locating economic agents 
As an ontological issue, the location of agency concerns how we 
distinguish or pick out agents in economic life. To appreciate the nature 
of the issue, it is worth noting at the outset that this aspect of the topic of 
agent identity is less central to philosophers who investigate personal 
identity. When philosophers analyze the conditions under which indi-
viduals maintain their personal identities, they generally suppose that 
they know whose identity is at issue (namely, that of individual human 
beings), and thus rarely stop to worry about where agency is located (and 
whether individual human beings are indeed agents). For example, in 
Parfit's (1984) famous teletransporter examples regarding personal sur-
vival, he imagines what might happen to himself were his own body 
dematerialized and reconstituted elsewhere under various scenarios. 
Most economists also tend to assume that locating agents is not an issue, 
since they believe that individuals are automatically agents. Even when 
economists concern themselves with situations in which people make 
choices for others, mobilize others' resources, and act as others' agents, 
that is, in principal- agent situations, they assume there is no difficulty in 
locating agency, since delegated authority stems from choices previously 
made by autonomous individuals who are agents. But it seems fair to say 
that without an account of what makes an individual an independent 
agent in the first place - one in whom the power to affect the world exists 
- it is question-begging to say that individuals are even in a position to 
delegate authority and assign decision-making responsibility to others. 
Unlike philosophers in their treatment of personal identity, then, econo-
mists cannot avoid first confronting the problem of how we locate 
causally efficacious agents preparatory to a full analysis of the scope and 
extent of their powers as distinguishable agents. 
Note first, then, that when we use language to refer to things, we 
suppose that we can locate and distinguish the things we refer to . If one 
uses the term "chair" referentially, this implies one can pick out an object 
thought to be a chair, and distinguish it from other pieces of furniture. 
This suggests we ought to look at how economic theories make reference 
to the things they name. But before doing so, we ought to first ask 
ourselves what conception of reference a theory involves, since it is well 
possible a theory employs a view of reference that does not help us to 
pick out the sorts of things we are interested in ontologically identifying. 
For example, it might be my theory of reference that " whatever my 
friends call a 'dog' does indeed pick out real dogs in the world," where 
that they also refer to people they dislike as dogs tells us that my theory 
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of reference does not enable me to consistently pick out real dogs. Of 
course these friends do refer when they use the term "dog," but because 
their use of the term is often metaphorical, they do not thereby help us to 
disinguish and locate real dogs. Here my theory of reference is inap-
propriate to the task at hand. And since our project here is not to 
investigate the rhetorical use of language, but to pursue the ontological 
project behind referential realism, we ought similarly to ask whether our 
economic theories employ theories of reference that will allow us to 
locate and distinguish real economic agents. 
Let us distinguish two philosophical approaches to reference for 
constative utterances, the early analytic Fregean theory dating from the 
turn of the century (Frege 1892; Russell 1905), and the more recent 
causal theory associated with scientific realism (Kripke 1971; Putnam 
1970, 1973). The Fregean theory explains lhe meaning of a name 
(common noun or proper name) in terms of its intention, or in terms of 
that conjunction of properties analytically true of the name. As Putnam 
characterizes it, 
On the traditional view, the meaning of say, " lemon," is given by specifying a 
conjunction of properties. For each of these properties, the statement " lemons 
have the property P" is an analytic truth; and if PI , P2, ... , Pn are all of the 
properties in the conjunction, then " anything with all of the properties PI , .. . , 
Pn is a lemon" is likewise an analytic truth. (1970, p. 51) 
The theory then supposes that the intension of a name determines its 
extension, where a name's extension is that to which it refers - or more 
simply that meaning determines reference. The theory is neo-Kantian in 
that the logical structure of language (rather than as for Kant the 
psychological structure of the mind) determines what can be picked out 
and said about things in the world. But this is problematic, since it 
essentially renders the idea of a world independent of thought empty (as 
Kant did the notion of things-in-themselves), creates ambiguities between 
the act of judging and that which is judged, and generates paradoxes of 
meaning variance across conceptual structures a fa Kuhn. 
On the causal theory, in contrast, it is argued that names come to refer 
in a quite different manner. Things are, as it were, " baptized" at some 
historical point in time, and then generally retain their original names 
through causal chains of events linking the inaugural naming to later 
language-users, despite modifications in meaning and the way names are 
understood. On this theory reference is accounted for in terms of our 
causal interactions with things in the world and among us, and presup-
poses that we can onto logically distinguish real entities from one another. 
Unlike the neo-Kantian approach, that is, things in the world are first 
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supposed to be distinguishable and re-identifiable through change, and 
this conditions the way in which we use language to refer to them. Put 
differently, reference is not established in an a priori manner by picking 
out things to which definitions should apply, but rather in an a posteriori 
manner by affixing names to the things we distinguish. 
In Davis (1989), I argued that neoclassical economic theory in its 
axiomatic form employs a Fregean approach to reference, and that, 
because the Fregean approach does not provide an adequate account of 
reference, axiomatic neoclassical economic theory thereby fails to distin-
guish and pick out real economic agents in the world. Neoclassical 
economic theory relies on the Fregean theory of reference, essentially 
because it distinguishes and defines distinct economic agents in terms 
their different preference sets. Of course it is not analytically true that 
particular individuals have the particular preferences they do, but it is 
analytically true that any given individual is defined in terms of his or her 
own preferences. Our language sometimes obscures this point, because it 
allows us to say two individuals may "have" the same preferences. 
However, the theory clearly holds that two individuals may not have the 
same preferences in the sense of one doing the other's preferring. 
Preferring, as a propositional attitude, always implicates the particular 
individual doing the preferring, and is thus inseparable from that 
individual. Understood in this way, the theory holds that distinguishing 
two individuals is analytically equivalent to distinguishing two sets of 
own preferences. 
How, then, does reference actually fail on this view? In Davis (1995), I 
argued that using an individual's own preferences to distinguish that 
individual presupposes the very individual those preferences are meant to 
distinguish . If a set of preferences picks out an individual, they must be 
that individual 's preferences and not someone else's preferences. But if 
we have already picked out the individual to whom a set of preferences 
belongs in order to call these preferences that individual 's own prefer-
ences, we cannot then use those preferences to pick out that individual. I 
Neoclassical theory thus involves itself in a circularity in its implicit 
account of individual and agent identity, arguably causing it to employ 
the ad hoc assumption that preferences are exogenous to foreclose critical 
evaluation of its individualist project. For our purposes, however, the 
conclusion that is of chief interest here is that the theory is unable to 
I An early antecedent to this argument is Bishop Butler's charge that Locke's view, that 
individual identity depends on memory and states of consciousness, was circular. Butler 
argued that memory presupposes rather than explains personal identity. Hume, whose 
critique of the idea of the self is better known, essentially followed Butler in this argument 
(see Noonan 1989). 
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locate real economic agents in the world. Its claim that individuals are 
agents, that is, is not supported by an understanding of reference that 
gives us a means of actually distinguishing individuals as real economic 
agents. 
It thus follows that neoclassical theory lacks a way of systematically 
distinguishing between agents who are single individuals and agents 
made up of groups of individuals. Gary Becker's family decision-making 
analysis is a good example (1976). Husbands' preferences are taken to 
represent wives' and other family members' preferences, thus substituting 
the preferences of a single individual for a group of individuals. But 
because own preferences cannot pick out individuals, this account cannot 
distinguish (as feminists have continually argued) the case of a husband 
acting on his own preferences in the name of the family from the case of 
a husband acting on some sort of truly shared family preferences. 
Subsequent intra-family bargaining models h;ve attempted to get around 
Becker's difficulty by assuming that husbands and wives are both 
independent agents whose negotiations create shared preferences for the 
family as a joint agent. But this similarly begs the question of whether 
husbands and wives are independent agents in the first place. In 
comparison to Becker's analysis that cannot determine whether husbands 
are single agents or representatives of group agents, the bargaining 
approach cannot determine whether individual agents constitute a group 
agent or a pre-existing group agent enfranchises individual agents. 
But that neoclassical theory cannot credibly distinguish between 
agents who are single individuals and agents made up of groups of 
individuals, implies that it fails to locate agency in the world. And, failing 
in this first step, it cannot proceed to investigate the issues surrounding 
determination of the scope of agency, where that concerns the duration 
and magnitude with which distinguishable economic agents exercise their 
powers. Indeed in Davis (1995), it was also argued that even were we to 
suppose individuals are distinguishable economic agents (or locate 
agency in individuals), neoclassicism's dynamical analysis of human 
capital accumulation precludes its re-identifying them as distinct agents 
through change. Specifically, since on time allocation models (Becker 
1965) certain of an individual's preferences are enhanced in significance 
by past accumulations of human capital, human capital accumulations 
indirectly contribute to the constitution of an individual's identity over 
time. But that we accumulate particular human capital stocks is partly a 
function of the price system and thus the decisions and preferences of 
others. This indirect influence of other individuals' preferences on any 
given individual disrupts neoclassicism's attempt to distinguish indi-
viduals in terms of their own preferences, making their re-identification 
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through change problematic. And lacking an ability to track individuals 
through change, the theory has few resources to explain the scope of 
agency in terms of its magnitude and duration. 
What this discussion of neoclassical theory is meant to demonstrate is 
that addressing the problems involved in explaining agency requires that 
a theory be formulated so as to take ontological commitments seriously. 
One cannot, then, simply assume individuals are always and everywhere 
agents, because one's ideological predilections encourage one to think 
this must be the case. Rather, given this intellectual predisposition, one 
needs to establish when and how individuals are able to act as agents. 
Neoclassical theory, to be fair, is hardly alone in its limited success in this 
regard, since similar sorts of arguments could be developed to show how 
methodologically collectivist theories fail to refer to distinguishable and 
re-identifiable group economic agents. In the section that follows an 
attempt is made to describe how one might go about locating economic 
agents through an analysis that places ontological realism in the fore-
ground. 
3 A realist approach to locating economic agents 
How should we proceed if our first task is to explain how economic 
agents are distinguished from one another? The circularity problem 
associated with the Fregean approach to reference arises when one 
attempts to distinguish agents using an a priori, definitional criterion, 
primarily motivated by theoretical concerns (as the neoclassical prefer-
ence criterion is motivated by the desire to apply the theory of instru-
mental rationality to all economic agents). Suppose, however, one were 
rather to attempt distinguishing economic agents in an a posteriori 
manner where this involved making explicit use of the causal theory of 
reference. In this instance, theory is built up around an inherited set of 
ontological commitments, namely, that such-and-such sorts of things 
exist in the world, which we are able to refer to by developing our 
theories around past namings (or "baptisms") meant to pick out and 
distinguish these real entities. Theory from this perspective follows rather 
than precedes reference, and accordingly allows different theories to 
share objects of reference, and so avoid the problem of meaning 
variance. 
It will naturally be said in response to this suggestion that premising a 
set of ontological commitments itself involves some theory, and that it is 
illusory to think one can postpone theorization until one has agreed on 
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what one is referring to. This is certainly correct in that there is indeed a 
theorization implicit in one's ontological claims, but I will put this 
difficulty aside here by assuming that the sort of implicit theorizing we 
imagine attaches to many of our ontological commitments is extra-
theoretical in the sense of not belonging to any particular theory 
developed by an identifiable collection of professional theorists. Different 
economic theories, for example, can refer to "markets" as real entities, 
but in doing so they adopt a very basic conception not reducible to any 
one group's theorization of markets . Specifically, markets involve ex-
change, the items exchanged are valued, traders in markets have different 
interests, some form of property relationship is implied, etc. Loosely, we 
might say that rather than presuppose implicit theorizations, the use of 
terms such as "markets" signals widely held beliefs we may understand 
as constituting collections of "social facts. " F.Dllowing Gilbert (1989) we 
may characterize social facts as facts in the eyes of reasonably informed 
individuals in society, where their ordinary understanding of these facts 
contributes a conceptual element separate from the further interpretative 
contribution that comes of more systematic analysis in social science 
theory. The prior element of understanding contributed by society both 
underlies social facts' status and acceptance as facts in society, and serves 
as a conceptual penumbra about these facts that assists their further 
analysis in more formal social science investigation. An a posteriori social 
science approach, then, attempts to anchor investigation in what the 
social world takes as given, rather than in a series of deductions made 
from theories constructed around views of a subject matter's essential 
requirements.2 
From this perspective, we may suppose, first, that analysis of the set of 
social facts relevant to agency begins with attention to evidence regarding 
how economic agents themselves understand the distribution and scope 
of agency in the economy. Presumably agents of any sort must rely on 
some understanding of agency in order to act as agents. Here the causal 
theory of reference comes into play in that an acknowledged set of social 
facts would naturally include facts about how historically we have come 
to pick out and refer to agents. On the causal theory, reference depends 
on historical namings or "baptisms" and subsequent chains of connec-
tion as names evolve, change, and are modified. Economic agents, then, 
rely on this information in acting as agents just as they rely on various 
other ordinary social facts . 
Second, our investigation of those social facts relevant to agency 
2 The approach here also distances itself from the traditional empiricist project of beginning 
with scientists' collections of observation statements. 
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requires we also recognize that, because economics in its mISSIOn as 
causal social science aims to characterize economic life in terms of 
relatively enduring relationships, the evidence regarding agency relevant 
to our interests in economics concerns what we may observe in persistent 
patterns of economic activity. Clearly we do not expect to learn much 
about agency from evidence about episodic phenomena. These two 
points together imply that the social facts which underlie an analysis of 
agency in economics are those recognized by the economy's agents in 
connection with recurring patterns of activity investigated in science. It 
seems uncontroversial to add, thirdly, that these recurring patterns of 
activity involve intentional behavior in situations of social interaction. 
Intentional behavior, of course, is our principal concern in investigating 
economic agency, while social interaction allows our scope to include 
relations between individual agents, between group agents, and between 
individual and group agents. 
Following the lead of Nelson and Winter (1982), then, I propose that 
these relatively enduring patterns economists wish to investigate be 
initially described as routines or as routinized behavior. I define routines 
in economic life and elsewhere as organized collections of rules and 
procedures that guide behavior in regularly encountered circumstances. 
Routines help individuals recognize domains of activity in which they 
may act. Routines do not themselves have causal powers, but rather 
create a framework in social settings that permits the assignment of 
agency to individuals who act. 3 Central in this regard is the normative 
force possesed by the rules and conventions that make up routines. Rules 
and conventions tell us what we ought to do when we participate in a 
given routine. Thus an individual who abides by a routine becomes an 
agent in accepting the normative force of the rules and conventions 
characteristic of that routine.4 
Other units of social analysis might be proposed, but there are 
important advantages to focusing on routines in an analysis of agency. 
First, since routines may be investigated for both individuals and groups, 
an examination of routines per se is not likely to bias our analysis at the 
outset toward either individualist or collectivist interpretations of the 
location of agency. Indeed both individual and group responsibilities are 
often recognizable in the duties that many routines imply. Second, 
because routines tend to be relatively self-contained social practices, they 
3 Obviously some routines are personal and carried out mostly apart from other 
individuals. The discussion here focuses on those routines that involve social interaction. 
4 I do not wish to suggest that agency does not exist outside of the context of routines. 
Routines, however, provide a valuable framework in which agency may be explai ned in 
economic life. 
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appear more susceptible to analysis than many other more complex 
forms of behavior. More complex behavioral settings can indeed plau-
sibly be argued to combine routines, so that these " institutional" 
environments are explained in terms of routines as their elements. Third, 
routines are an ordinary feature of the social world, and as such their 
common-sense description does not require immediate introduction of 
elaborate theoretical constructs. In fact, almost anyone can both describe 
a variety of routines in which people engage, and on prompting cite a 
number of facts relevant to the scope and location of agency that these 
routines imply. 
For example, in economic life, say in the context of business firm 
routines, many can describe routines employees regularly observe, and 
analyze this evidence to produce an initial set of facts regarding the 
location of agency in business firms. What sort of analysis we initially 
attempt of course depends upon what cause-and-effect questions immedi-
ately concern us. Suppose we are interested in how a firm 's organization 
causes it to address new business, and we find that a firm's routine is that 
customer orders to purchase goods are sent sequentially to the billing 
and shipping departments. That the group agent made up of the shipping 
department does not act before the group agent made up of the billing 
department locates agency at different points and different times in the 
firm with respect to new orders. If we also learn that departmental sub-
routines require that new business be processed by teams of individuals 
in each department, we might further conclude that agency rests with 
departments rather than individuals. Alternatively, if in each department 
the routine adopted requires that the first available individual take sole 
responsibility for new business until it is concluded, we might say that 
individuals act as agents, but that their agency is rotating and recurrent, 
rather than continuous, where this is a matter of numbers of individuals 
in a department, volume of business, time needed per order, etc. Or, a 
department might include a routine for trouble-shooting unexpected 
problems that is always delegated to the same individual. This sort of 
case clearly would contrast with the revolving responsibility type of 
routine in which individuals act in the name of their department. 
Note that these simple examples treat routines as if they were isolated 
from one another. However, routines clearly occupy places in larger 
patterns of behavior and/or complex organizations, and how these larger 
patterns of behavior and organizations are structured generally plays an 
important role in determining which routines are exercised and which 
ones go unexercised. Thus a trouble-shooter type agent in one depart-
ment of a business firm who has a particular set of duties as a 
representative of that department might well find that he or she has prior 
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duties according to a set of firm routines that transcend department 
routines. Clearly then, analyzing the interconnections and hierarchical 
relationships between routines in this fashion would be a step toward a 
more general theory of action for business firms and other sorts of 
organizations. But it still seems reasonable to suppose that routines 
remain the building blocks for an analysis of economic agency, since 
whether or not a given routine is exercised does not alter the power of 
individuals to initiate sequences of events on the basis of that routine. 
That is, if individuals acting in connection with routines are plausibly 
described as the source of events, we may comfortably speak of the 
action in which organizations engage in a derivative manner, prepared to 
provide an analysis of how the organization structures action in terms of 
its assignment of responsibilities to individuals and collections of indi-
viduals through their embedding in routines. 
The shorthand claim that routines can be plausibly described as event-
generating may be reinforced by attention to what individuals involved 
in routines tend to believe individuates particular routines as distinct 
forms of activity. Note again, then, that an important dimension of 
routines is that the rules and procedures they involve typically possess an 
element of obligatoriness. Following a routine means one ought to follow 
certain rules and adopt certain procedures in the circumstances in which 
the routine applies. Putting aside whether we understand this as substan-
tively or procedurally rational, one way of capturing the normative force 
routines possess is to think of routines as depending upon systems of 
mutually reinforcing expectations held by the individuals who participate 
in them. Routines may then be thought to be forms of conventional 
behavior in which agents act interdependently in such a manner that each 
recognizes rules and practices in routines have normative force. Thomas 
Schelling, David Lewis, and Robert Sudgen have contributed to an 
explanation of conventions as spontaneously emerging equilibrium solu-
tions to coordination problems in interdependent decision-making con-
texts. However, we cannot follow them too closely in their game-theory 
formulation of conventional behavior if we want to explain agency by 
analyzing the social facts routines imply, since their approach assumes 
individuals are instrumentally rational or rational in Bayesian terms, and 
we have seen that this presupposes that individuals are already character-
izable as independent agents. Since our a posteriori method is meant to 
avoid the circularity and question-begging regarding agency inherent in 
the neoclassical approach, our seeing the rule-governed routines as 
systems of mutually reinforcing expectations must allow that, though 
individuals may not always have the status of agents, they may nonethe-
less have mutually reinforcing beliefs about expected behavior. 
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What, then, does treating routines as forms of conventional behavior 
based on mutually reinforcing expectations contribute to our understand-
ing of agency? In a simple two-individual case, mutual expectations 
regarding one individual's entitlement or responsibility to act as an agent 
may be described as follows: individual x expects to do A, individual y 
expects individual x to do A, individual x expects individual y to expect 
individual x to do A, and so on potentially to higher order expectations. 
What we see here is that in determining entitlement or responsibility to 
act, expectations such as these confer agency status by recording the 
judgments of the individuals involved. Since our method treats social 
facts as widely recognized phenomena, treating routines as forms of 
conventional behavior based on mutually reinforcing expectations im-
plicitly provides us with a criterion by which agents may be located and 
distinguished from one another. Abstracting Ol.lt this location criterion, 
we may thus say that in the context of a given routine, an independent 
agent is that individual or group of individuals that expects to act as an 
agent, is expected by others to act as an agent, believes others have the 
relevant expectation, is thought to have this belief by others, and so on. 5 
4 Addressing the scope of agency 
The issue of the scope of economic agency concerns the magnitude and 
duration of the powers that distinguishable economic agents may be 
represented to realistically exercise as causal agents. Here there are 
affinities to the philosophers' topic of personal identity, since philoso-
phers often imagine situations in which an individual suffers an impair-
ment in his or her power to act, and then ask whether that individual's 
identity is sustained . For example, an individual might lose consciousness 
for an extended period of time. Does this person remain himself or 
herself during this period? Or an individual might be transported into 
some unfamiliar setting in which his or her chief skills and views fail to 
apply. Must this individual become a new person? In economics, 
however, the parallel topic of agent identity necessarily approaches the 
magnitude and duration of agent powers from a somewhat different 
perspective. Recall that philosophers interested in personal identity are 
typically concerned with the fate of some already distinguished indi-
vidual. But economists cannot presuppose who or what an economy's 
5 I put aside the question of what sort of regress is involved here. See Mongin and Walliser 
(1988) for a discussion of when infinite regressions are problematic and when not. In 
general, not all infinite regressions need be paradoxical. 
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agents are if they intend to actually explain agency. Nor for that matter 
should economists follow philosophers of personal identity in supposing 
that economic agents (when distinguished) are likely candidates for 
survival through change in time and/or circumstances. Whereas philoso-
phers hope to demonstrate personal identity is sustained through a 
variety of changes, or at least say under what conditions this may be the 
case, in economic life organizational and behavioral developments often 
erase the space occupied by particular routines together with the agency 
relations they imply. Consequently, just as we cannot presuppose that in 
economics we are automatically concerned with certain types of agents, 
for example, individuals or classes in the methodological individualist 
and collectivist traditions, so neither can we assume that certain types of 
agents automatically retain the status of being agents across different 
spheres of activity and through processes of change. 
Explaining the magnitude and duration, or strength and permanence, 
of particular forms of economic agency accordingly requires that we 
place boundaries on distinguishable agency relations both at a point in 
time and also through time. At a point in time, the magnitude or strength 
of an agent's powers are a matter of how far-reaching the effects of an 
agent's actions are. For example, if in a business firm a team of 
individuals has responsibility for a set of cross-department activities, say, 
with respect to firm internal audit procedures, the influence of this team-
agent's actions may in certain circumstances outweigh the actions taken 
by departmental agents. Conversely the scope of the latter's activities at 
any point in time would be partly defined by scope the team-agent's 
activities possessed. Regarding an agent's powers through time, that is, 
their duration or permanence, we need to be able to say when a given 
instance of agency ceases to operate, and when another emerges. Again 
using the business firm as a type of organization, we might in this 
instance look for changes that ended reliance on some routines while 
creating the occasion for others. Technological change affecting infor-
mation storage surely would provide examples of this kind. Activities 
and routines made obsolete by the appearance of new ones mark off the 
boundaries of agency relations through time. 
These remarks, however, only provide an initial outline of the dimen-
sions involved in explicating the scope of economic agency relations, since 
they ignore the complexity of most real-world cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Following J. S. Mill, contemporary philosophers of economics 
(Cartwright 1983, 1989; Lawson 1989; Hausman 1992; Miiki 1994)6 have 
6 I ignore here the differences between these individuals regarding interpretation of ceteris 
paribus clauses. 
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begun to sort out this complexity by distinguishing (i) between an agent's 
having a power to act in principle and that agent's actions possessing 
distinguishable effects in the presence or absence of overlapping and/or 
countervailing sources of action, and (ii) between an agent's actually 
exercising a capacity to act and not exercising that capacity, for whatever 
reason. Thus in terms of our point-in-time example above regarding the 
magnitude of an agent's powers, it could be found in terms of dimension 
(i) that a team-agent responsible for firm audit procedures has routine 
authority over individual departments, but that individuals within a 
number of departments routinely delay providing the relevant data (a 
case of countervailing power). Alternatively, rather than engage in 
delaying actions, individuals within some departments could be found to 
expedite firm audit routines (a case of overlapping power). Both of these 
cases might further be complicated along di11lension (ii) were individuals 
in some departments able to engage in delaying actions, but did not do so 
(a case of an unexercised countervailing power), or were individuals in 
some departments able to engage in expediting actions, but did not do so 
(a case of unexercised overlapping power). Parallel cases concerning 
agency relationships through time might also be imagined. 
These additional characteristics of real-world cause-and-effect rela-
tionships clearly make the analysis of the scope of agency relations more 
difficult, but attention to them seems only to reinforce the importance of 
first sorting out simple agency relationships before looking at the 
interrelationships between them. Ontologically, that is, investigation of 
the basic concepts of agent identity involving location and scope precedes 
investigation of their manifestations in complex cause-and-effect phe-
nomena. This claim may seem at odds with the social facts approach 
taken here, since it could be argued that ordinary individuals' appraisal 
of routine behavior is recorded in terms of the manifestations or observed 
effects of agency relations rather than in terms of their originating 
sources. Against this, the position taken above is that ordinary indi-
viduals understand routines in terms of responsibilities to act, where 
having responsibility is an element of being an agent. Thus ordinary 
thinking regularly operates in simple ontological terms even though this 
more philosophical language is typically unfamiliar to most people. In 
contrast, what ordinary thinking is not particularly good at is moving 
from recognition of basic relationships of responsibility and agency to an 
analysis of complex agency patterns, both on account of the fact that 
ontological matters are rarely enunciated in ordinary thinking, and 
because of the inherent difficulties involved in working out representa-
tionally adequate, ontologically unified accounts of cross-cutting, multi-
dimensional agency interrelationships. 
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What the analysis here generally calls for, then, is the examination of 
structures of routinized behavior in various domains of economic activity 
within which it appears possible to distinguish decentralized responsibil-
ities for action on the part of different sorts of economic agents. The 
business firm as a type of organization naturally lends itself to a variety 
of examples, and the method illustrated in the examples above would 
equally apply to the analysis of agency in the family, government, and 
other distinguishable domains in which routines are commonly noted. 
But our emphasis on routines as relatively enduring, and the relative 
enduringness of these traditional domains of interest, should not be 
thought to imply that the agency relations we may ascertain to lie behind 
routines by this method constitute permanent causal elements for 
economics as a social science. That is, in addition to the complexity we 
encounter in terms of multiple sources of causality, complexity also 
enters our analysis on account of the evolution of structures of routinized 
behavior. This evolution, it seems fair to say, comes about because 
economic agents' actions are both conditioned by the frameworks in 
which they operate, and simultaneously condition or bring about change 
in those frameworks themselves. Suppose we were to treat economic 
evolution as a multi-mechanism process with both selection and adaptive 
learning and also as a multi-level process with individuals and groups of 
individuals acting as agents (Vromen 1995, p. 213). Then explaining the 
scope and location of agency would require our considering the relative 
success of different types of routines empowering different types of 
agents in different types of environments. That evolution may well 
transform the forms which agency assumes, however, only demonstrates 
the importance of having a method for explaining its location and scope. 
5 Three concluding remarks 
(I) The discussion of agent identity here has proceeded as if one might 
investigate the location and individuation of agents apart from treatment 
of the scope of their powers as causal agents. There is modest justification 
for this in that the causal theory of reference adopted above allows us to 
communicate about things in the world without agreeing upon theories 
about these things. In practice, however, conventional location of 
responsibility to act according to systems of mutually reinforcing expec-
tations quickly introduces scope of agency considerations into talk about 
who or what an economy's agents are. Being able to say where 
responsibility to act lies typically involves being able to say something 
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about what that responsibility involves. At the same time, because action 
often possesses considerable unintended effects, analysis of the scope of 
agency goes beyond what our location criterion involves. Those party to 
a convention cannot anticipate all that assignment of responsibility for 
action implies, particularly where an agent's actions have transformative 
effects upon the structure of routinized behavior itself. 
(2) A theme emphasized in the discussion here is that there is an 
important difference between the way philosophers approach the 
problem of personal identity and the way economists need to approach 
the problem of agent identity. My view is that if economists were to 
begin to investigate agent identity they would tend to do so along the 
lines of the problem of personal identity. The worst perpetrators of this 
misconsception are neoclassical economists who generally assume that all 
individuals are agents (and that households and firm s, when acting as 
agents, are resolvable into collections of individuals). But traditional 
institutionalists and Marxists have made comparable mistakes by sub-
stituting their collective agents into the neoclassical equation. In both 
cases, normative reasoning about preferred social subjects displaces 
ontological reasoning about causal power and cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Economists, however, need to examine the way the world works if 
they are to explain it. Indeed, policy goals regarding the well-being of 
different types of agents may only be promoted with an adequate 
understanding of the economic process. 
(3) This paper began with reference to two methodological traditions 
in economics regarding agency: methodological individualism and 
methodological collectivism. The argument of this paper should have 
made clear that these orientations are both ontologically naIve. Their 
being so is in part a matter of historical forces alluded to in the remark 
above. No one would deny that individuals and classes have been 
defended as economic agents, because doing so has suited different social 
thinkers ' world views. Nonetheless, agency as a domain of analysis is 
susceptible to careful examination. That it has not received it seems due 
in part to a failure of philosophers and methodologists of economics to 
focus on ontological issues. Recently, the topic of causality has begun to 
receive some attention (e.g. Hoover 1990). The hope this paper concludes 
with is that this interest will be further extended to investigation of the 
agents that initiate cause-and-effect sequences. 
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